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JUDICIAL CREATION OF A FEDERAL CAUSE OF ACTION FOR DAMAGES
FOR FOURTH AMENDMENT VIOLATIONS BY FEDERAL OFFICERS.
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents Of The Federal Bureau Of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 338 (1971)
Plaintiff was arrested by Federal Narcotics Agents for alleged viola-
tions of federal narcotics laws. He contended that agents entered his
apartment without a warrant, manacled him in the presence of his fam-
ily, and searched the premises thoroughly. He was searched, interro-
gated, and booked at the federal courthouse in Brooklyn; however, the
charges against him were later dismissed. Plaintiff brought action
against the agents in federal district court seeking money damages based
on alleged violations of his fourth amendment rights. He claimed the
search caused him great humiliation, embarrassment, and mental
suffering. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdic-
tion and failure to state a cause of action) The Second Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed on the latter ground,2 and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari. 3 Held: An alleged violation of fourth amendment rights by
federal officers states a valid cause of action for damages.4
Before Bivens there were three means of implementing the constitu-
tional guaranties of the fourth amendment: (1) common law tort reme-
1. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 276 F. Supp. 12
(E.D.N.Y. 1967).
2. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 409 F.2d 718 (2d
Cir. 1969).
3. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 399 U.S. 905 (1970).
4. Bivens v. Six Unknowp Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 338 (1971).
In Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946), the Supreme Court held that federal courts have jurisdiction
to decide whether the fourth amendment can support a cause of action for damages. However, it
failed to reach the issue decided in the principal case. On remand, 71 F. Supp. 813 (S.D. Calif.
1947), the district court held that plaintiff's complaint did not state a federal cause of action.
Subsequent lower court decisions have followed this case as dispositive on the issue of inferred
constitutionally based remedies. E.g., United States v. Faneca, 332 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 380 U.S. 917 (1965); Johnston v. Earle, 245 F.2d 793 (9th Cir. 1964); Martin v. Wyzanski,
262 F. Supp. 925 (D. Mass. 1967); Koch v. Zuieback, 194 F. Supp. 651 (S.D. Calif. 1961), aff'd,
316 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1963); Garfield v. Palmieri, 193 F. Supp. 582 (E.D.N.Y. 1960), aff d, 290
F.2d 821 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 827 (1961).
5. Theoretically there are two other means of enforcing the fourth amendment: (1) criminal
prosecutions of police for violations and (2) administrative sanctions. Both have insignificant prac-
tical value. District attorneys are not likely to prosecute police officers for violation, and admini-
strators are equally unlikely to impose effective sanctions on their own officers. See Foote, Tort
Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MINN. L. REV. 493-95 (1955); Oaks,
Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 665, 673-74 (1970).
In his dissent in Bivens, Chief Justice Burger offers another means of enforcing the fourth
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dies-available against both federal and state officers; (2) the exclusion-
ary rule-applicable in state and federal prosecutions; (3) statutory ac-
tion-applicable against state officials only.
Traditionally, a victim of an unreasonable search has had recourse in
state court. There, he could maintain an action in tort to vindicate his
constitutional rights.' This remedy is available against federal as well as
state officials.
7
However, since 1914 the exclusionary rule has been regarded as the
primary and most effective means of enforcing the fourth amendment.8
In Weeks v. United States,9 the Court ruled that evidence obtained by
an illegal search and seizure is inadmissable in federal criminal prosecu-
tions. 1 The fourth amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches
and seizures was made binding on the states in 1949.11 Finally, the
exclusionary rule was extended to state prosecutions in 1961 .12
Since 1961 there has been an additional civil remedy for fourth
amendment violations. In Monroe v. Pape, the Court ruled that a victim
of an unreasonable search by state officials is afforded a federal cause
of action for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.13
A federal cause of action based on violation of fourth amendment
amendment. He proposes that Congress enact legislation waiving sovereign immunity with regard
to violations of the fourth amendment by government officials committed in the course of law
enforcement. The plan would authorize a cause of action for damages based on fourth amendment
violations and would create a quasi-judicial tribunal to hear all cases arising under the statute.
6. McClung v. Benton, 123 Iowa 368, 98 N.W. 881 (1954); Krehbiel v. Henkle, 142 Iowa 677,
121 N.W. 378 (1909); Goad v. State, 239 Md. 345,349, 211 A.2d 337 (1964) (Dictum).
7. Day v. Gallup, 69 U.S. 97 (1864); Slocum v. Maryberry, 15 U.S. 1, 10 (1817).
8. Oaks, supra note 5, at 666; Paulsen, Safeguards in the Law of Search and Seizure, 52 Nw.
U.L. REv. 65, 74 (1957);41 ILL. L. REv. 558, 560 (1946).
9. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
10. The exclusionary rule rests mainly on a theory of deterrence. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S.
618 (1965) (indicating that the basis of the exclusionary rule is solely deterrence by not applying it
retroactively); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960), "The rule is calculated to prevent,
not to repair. It's purpose is to deter -to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only
effectively available way-by removing the incentive to disregard it." Oaks, supra note 5, at 668-
72.
II. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
12. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). For a more detailed history of the exclusionary rule see
Broeder, The Decline and Fall of Wolf v. Colorado, 41 NEB. L. REV. 185 (1961); Hartman,
Admissability of Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and Seizure Under the United States
Constitution, 28 MOD. L. REV. 298 (1965).
13. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). The fourth amendment was made applicable to the states through the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Supreme Court reasoned that 42
U.S.C. § 1983 was meant to enforce provisions of the fourteenth amendment; thus, the Court held
that a claim based on a violation of the fourth amendment by state officers states a valid cause of
action.
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rights by federal officers is not provided by the constitution or by statute.
The Supreme Court, however, has been willing to derive remedies from
statutory or constitutional provisions. Judicial creation of damage reme-
dies based on statutory provisions is well supported by precedent. 14 There
is also ample authority for judicial formulation of injunctive and equit-
able relief as a means of vindicating constitutional guaranties.' 5 How-
ever, in only a few instances has the Court fashioned a damage remedy
resting directly on the Constitution." When the Court has acted in this
area, it has indicated that a remedy will not be implied from a statutory
or constitutional provision absent a showing of its necessity to vindicate
the provision. 17
In Bivens the Supreme Court held that the fourth amendment is an
independent limitation on the power of federal officials regardless of
local law. Respondent argued that the fourth amendment merely limits
a federal officer's defense in a state tort action. If he had violated the
fourth amendment, he would be denied the defense of valid federal au-
thority." The Supreme Court rejected this contention."9 Consequently an
infringement of the federally guaranteed right was deemed sufficient
14. E.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R. Co., 323
U.S. 192 (1944); Reitmaster v. Reitmaster, 162 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1947); Wills v. TWA, Inc., 200
F. Supp. 360 (S.D. Cal. 1961); See48 COLUM. L. REv. 1090 (1948).
15. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Ex
pare Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882); Hill, Constitutional
Remedies, 69 COLUM. L. Rav. 1109, 1112, 1138 (1969). The Court has acted in this area despite
the fact it has been historically regarded as a more proper function of Congress. See Hill, The Bill
of Rights and the Supervisory Power, 69 COLUM. L. Rev. 181,213 (1969).
16. In Swafford v. Templeton, 185 U.S. 487 (1902), and Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U.S. 58 (1900),
the Supreme Court upheld an action for damages based on the constitutional right to vote. The
Court chose not to rely on the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964). See also Nixon
v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927). This is another civil damages action based on a denial of the
right to vote in federal elections; and again, despite specific statutory authorization the court
suggests that the basis for the suit may be in common law.
See Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13 (1933), in which the Supreme Court allowed damages
for land inundated as result of a federal project. The self-executing quality of the fifth amendment
may prevent this from being precedent for actions based on other constitutional provisions. The
fifth amendment states, ". . . nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation." A right to go to court and obtain payment for land taken by the government would
seem inherent in the right to just compensation.
17. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961);
Katz, The Jurisprudence of Remedies: Constitutional Legality and the Law of Torts, 117 U. PA.
L. Rev. 1 (1968).
18. Brief for Respondent at 10-11, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 338 (1971).
19. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 394
(1971).
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basis for a federal cause of action."0 The Court rejected the notion that
to create this cause of action, there first must be a showing that money
damages is a necessary and integral part of the fourth amendment. 21 In
light of its general power to award money damages, the Court indicated
a mere showing of an injury resulting from an unconstitutional search
by federal officials was sufficient. 2  Though the Court chose to create this
remedy without requiring a showing of its necessity to vindicate the
provisions of the fourth amendment, it is questionable whether such a
showing could have been made.
Several arguments in support of a federal damages remedy have been
advanced. These include: (1) the ineffectiveness of the exclusionary rule
as an adequate deterrent;?3 (2) the absence of uniformity in the proce-
dural and substantive law of the various states that produces inconsistent
results for victims of fourth amendment violations; 24 (3) the inadequate
amount of damages available under the common law of many states.
Despite these arguments, the question still remains whether this new
cause of action will significantly enhance protection of fourth amend-
ment rights. It does not seem likely that it will deter unlawful conduct
by federal officers or increase compensation for violations. This remedy
will suffer from the same problems as the state civil remedies. Juries will
be hesitant to impose a judgment against a law enforcement official who
steps beyond his authority in an attempt to enforce the law.26 Also, those
bringing suit are often individuals with whom juries are not likely to
sympathize. 27 In the event a substantial money judgment is obtained,
there is a strong possibility that the defendant will be unable to satisfy
it. 28 With a small chance of recovering a substantial judgment, a victim
20. Id. at 395.
21. Id. at 397.
22. Id.
23. Allen, Federalism and the Fourth Amendment: A Requiem for Wolf, 1961 S. CT. L. REV.
1, 37-40 (1961); Oaks, supra note 5; Plumb, Illegal Enforcement of the Law, 24 CORNELL L.Q.
337 (1939); Comment, Evidence-Police Regulation by Rules of Evidence, 42 MICH. L. REV. 679,
685-88 (1944); Comment, Search and Seizure in Illinois: Enforcement of the Constitutional Right
of Privacy, 47 Nw. U.L. REv. 493 (1952).
24. Wolf v. United States 338 US. 25, 43-44 (1949) (Murphy, J., dissenting); See Foote, supra
note 5, at 498-506; Katz, supra note 16, at 52.
25. Wolf v. United States. 338 U.S. 25, 43 (1949) (Murphy, J., dissenting); Foote, supra note
5, at 498-500; Paulsen, supra note 6, at 72-73.
26. Oaks, supra note 5, at 673.
27. Foote, supra note 5, at 500; Paulsen, supra note 6, at 72-73.
28. Foote, supra note 5, at 499; Hall, The Law of Arrest in Relation to Contemporary Social
Problems, 3 U. CHm. L. REV. 345, 348 (1936); Oaks, supra note 5, at 673.
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of an unreasonable search is often unwilling to expend the time and
expense necessary for litigation. 29
This new cause of action is analagous to the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 rem-
edy regarding state officials. Suffering from the same defects as state
remedies, this federal statutory remedy has not added to the deterrence
of or compensation for unlawful conduct. 3t Indeed, there has not been a
great influx of suits against state police since Monroe v. Pape,3 2 and
there is little reason to expect a different result under this new cause of
action.
The decision in Bivens may be interesting from a jurisprudential
standpoint. It shows the court's willingness to make use of the tradi-
tional damage remedy in its search for an effective means of securing
constitutional interests. This could have implications regarding the gen-
eral role of the judiciary versus the legislature in the implementation of
constitutional guaranties. However, in light of its defects, its impact in
the area of fourth amendment rights seems minimal.
29. Foote, supra note 5, at 500; Note, Philadelphia Police Practices and the Law of Arrest, 100
U. PA. L. REV. 1182, 1209 (1952).
30. See Oaks, supra note 5, at 674; Comment, Civil Actions for Damages Under the Federal
Civil Rights Statutes, 45 TEx. L. REV. 1015, 1034 n. 124 (1967).
31. See Oaks, supra note 5, at 674; Comment, supra note 23, at 504-05.
32. Brief for Respondent at 27 n. 30, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau
of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 338 (1971).
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